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Abstract 
 
An outstanding characteristic of human tool use is its systematicity. We create and use tools 
for a vast variety of very specific purposes. Function representation, that is the capability to form 
stable function attributions to objects, is one of the main cognitive bases of human tool use. For 
some authors, the primary way this capability supports our propensity to create and use tools is by 
modulating the employment of causal reasoning. This is generally illustrated by alluding to the 
phenomenon known as functional fixedness, where knowing the typical use of an object makes it 
hard to conceive of alternative ways it could be put to use to solve problems. Previous research has 
shown that this phenomenon emerges during childhood. The studies presented in this thesis tested 
the hypothesis that function representation can also affect children’s causal reasoning when judging 
the functionality of tools used in ineffective (but typical) ways. At the same time, these studies 
sought to shed light on the role of the conventionality and designer intentions on children’s 
conceptual representations of artefacts. 
Chapter 2 presents the results of a study with 4 to 5 year old children who were presented 
with stories about a tool that could be used in two equally plausible ways. One critical function was 
presented as conventional (i.e., everybody used the tool that way) or designed (i.e., the tool was 
made for that purpose), while the alternate was presented as a possible function. Subsequently in the 
story, a character attempted to use the tool for the critical function, resulting in either malfunction or 
successful tool use. Participants were then asked to choose one of the functions as the real function 
of the tool. In the case of successful tool use, participants preferred the conventional and design 
functions to the alternative. Compared to a baseline condition that described both functions but gave 
no information about conventionality or design, participants chose the function involved in the 
malfunction episode as the real function of the tool more often when it was conventional, but not 
when it was a design function. This suggests that presenting information about a tool’s conventional 
use constrained children’s causal assessments of ineffective tool use in this age group. 
Chapter 3 presents the results of a study with 6- to 8-year-old children. This study used the 
same procedure than the one presented in Chapter 2 save that it included an additional condition. In 
this condition one of the functions was presented as conventional and the alternative as designed 
while there was not a malfunction episode. As in Chapter 2, when the tool was used successfully 
participants preferred the conventional and design functions to the alternative. In the baseline 
condition children eschewed the function that resulted in malfunction. When the function involved 
in the malfunction episode was conventional or designed, participants’ choices were at chance. This 
suggests that presenting information about social conventions and designer intentions constrained 
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assessments of tool use in this age group. This interpretation was reinforced by children’s lack of 
preference in the additional condition that pitted conventionality against design. 
In Chapter 4 I discuss the findings of the studies with 4- to 5- and 6- to 8-year old children. 
The results presented in this thesis constitute the first evidence of the effect functional knowledge in 
evaluations of inefficient tool use in children. Results support a developmental pathway where 
initially this effect is triggered only by social conventions but later both social conventions and 
designer’s intentions elicit this effect. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction  
 
 
One the most striking features of human tool use is its systematicity. We reliably use 
different kinds of tools for different and specific purposes. To give an everyday example, if you 
take a look at a study desk you would probably find very similar but different classes of objects 
defined by subtle variations in their functions: a lead pencil for writing things that can be easily 
erased if necessary, a ball pen for making permanent marks on paper, or a marker for highlighting 
phrases in a printed document. This is even more evident in cases of organized technical activities. 
For example, the different types of pencils that might be found on the desk described above would 
pale compared to the amount of colouring and drawing pencils that might be found in the studio of a 
professional artist. What makes humans so prone to create these kinds of technological traditions? 
Indeed, our capability to attribute lasting and specific functions to the different kinds of objects we 
interact with has been regarded as one of the most important cognitive foundations of tool use 
(Vaesen, 2012). Known as function representation, this is the focus of this thesis. 
 
The systematicity of tool use 
The concept of systematicity used here entails two related but distinguishable components: 
consistency and specificity. The notion of consistency refers to the reliable use of tools for the same 
goals over time, whereas specificity denotes the specialized use of particular tools for specific 
purposes. Theoretically these aspects can be dissociated if, for example, tools are built for specific 
purposes without reuse (i.e., specific but inconsistent tool use) or a very small collection of tools is 
used repeatedly for a large variety of purposes (consistent but no specific tool use). One way to 
understand the significance of these aspects of human tool use is by comparison with our closest 
relatives, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). In this section I will give an overview of this literature. 
Regarding specificity, long-term observational studies have documented the presence of tool 
sets for termite fishing and honey extraction (for a review see Boesch, 2013). For example, Boesch, 
Head and Robbins (2009) describe the sequential use of three different kinds of tools in honey 
extraction. When beehives are located in trees, first a pounder (a thick stick with a blunt end) is 
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used to break open the entrance of the nest, then enlargers (thinner sticks with a blunt end) are used 
to perforate and enlarge the different compartments within the hive, and finally collectors (thin 
sticks with a frayed end) are used to extract the honey. For ground nests, perforators (thin sticks 
with a blunt end) and collectors are used. Sanz, Morgan and Gulick (2004), describe two tools used 
in termite fishing. First, puncturing sticks are used to create access to tunnels of the underground 
termite chambers and then herbaceous brush-tip fishing probes are used to extract the termites. 
Regarding consistency, studies have also shown that chimpanzees reuse tools. For example, 
Sanz and colleagues (Sanz & Morgan, 2007; Sanz, Morgan & Gulick, 2004) reported that 
chimpanzees cached puncturing sticks at sites nearby termite nets and reused them in more than half 
of their visits to the nests. Carvalho et al. (2009) also found evidence of tool reuse. These authors 
ran a field experiment with a chimpanzee community in an “outdoor laboratory” site at Bossou 
Guinea over five separate field seasons. Chimpanzees at Bossou are known to use stones as 
hammers and anvils to crack hard-shelled nuts. Furthermore, previous studies had shown that they 
are sensitive to a number of features when selecting stones for nut cracking, such as size, weight 
and material (Biro et al., 2003; Carvalho et al., 2008). In order to evaluate whether chimpanzees 
would also discriminate among combination of stones and reuse them as a unique “nutcrackers”, 
Carvalho et al. (2009) made available to this group a specially selected set of stones and let them 
interact with the stones freely. The frequency with which each stone and combination of stones 
were used to crack nuts were recorded. Chimpanzees repeatedly combined specific hammer-anvil 
pairings. Although statistical analysis showed that most of such reuse arose incidentally out of 
individuals’ preferences for specific stones, they selected a few particular hammer-anvil 
combinations more often than would be expected on the basis of preferences for their individual 
elements. 
These studies thus suggest that in some contexts chimpanzees attribute specific functions to 
objects. Furthermore, in some cases these attributions are stable over time. Although this falls short 
of evidence of the kind of technological traditions characteristic of human populations, 
chimpanzees’ tool sets and reuse of tools opens the question about the uniqueness of humans’ 
ability to attribute functions to objects. Probably the most well known expression of this capacity is 
the phenomenon referred to as functional fixedness. Here, the demonstration of the typical function 
of a tool makes difficult for people to solve problems that require devising alternative uses for it. 
For example, in the candle problem (Dunker, 1945) subjects are asked to attach a candle on a screen 
using matches and a box of thumbtacks. To solve this problem they have to mount the candle in the 
box by melting wax on it and then use the thumbtacks to tack the box to the screen. In general 
subjects find this task difficult (Dunker, 1945). This is due to the interference of the primed typical 
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function of the box (i.e., containing) with the alternative use (i.e., candle-holder) as reflected by a 
better performance of subjects presented with the materials in the box (thus reflecting the container 
function) in comparison to subjects presented with the box empty (Adamson, 1952). In general, 
priming the typical function of a tool activates the mechanical features of associated with that 
function and blocks the activation of other features that might be relevant to perform other 
functions, which impairs the creative use of tools to solve problems (German, Truxaw & Defeyter, 
2007). 
A recent study by Hanus et al. (2011) suggests that chimpanzees may be susceptible to 
functional fixedness. In this study, subjects were presented with a floating peanut task: that is, they 
had to retrieve a peanut from the inside of a narrow tube. In order to retrieve the peanut the 
chimpanzees had to save water from a dispenser in their mouths and spit the water into the tube. In 
Experiment 1 none of the chimpanzees tested (all housed at the Leipzig Zoo) were successful. 
However, Experiment 2 found that in a different sample of chimpanzees (Ngamba Island), one third 
of the subjects added water to the tube. Two facts led Hanus and colleagues to hypothesize that the 
Leipzig chimpanzees may have been unable to solve the task due to functional fixedness. First, 
subjects at Leipzig were tested with an old well-known dispenser whereas subjects at Ngamba were 
tested with a new dispenser. Second, in a related study (Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2010) one 
chimpanzee was able learn to get the peanut out of the tube but only after having been provided 
with a new water source. To test this, in Experiment 3 they presented some of the Leipzig 
chimpanzees with the task again, but with a novel water dispenser, and found that the spitting 
frequency increased to levels indistinguishable from the Ngamba chimpanzees. While suggestive, 
these results need to be interpreted with caution given the small sample sizes (n = 19) and the 
relative low rate of success at the task. Even if a strong interpretation of this result is granted, in the 
current state of the evidence it is unclear whether functional fixedness in chimpanzees stems from 
associative processes, or from a conceptual system dedicated to organize information about tools 
and their functions, as in humans. The following section will characterize such a system. 
 
Function representation: theoretical perspectives 
As stated previously, function representation is the capacity to attribute lasting and specific 
functions to artefacts. In humans this is a conceptual capacity, namely it deals with the organization 
of information about artefacts in a coherent way. The main evidence of the conceptual nature of this 
process comes from functional fixedness. Early explanations of this phenomenon were based on 
associative learning (e.g., Maltzman, 1955; Smith, 1995). In these early theories, functional 
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fixedness was considered a consequence of people’s repeated exposure to the tools’ standard 
functions, which would result in stronger associations between the tools and these standard uses 
than other possible uses (Vaesen, 2012). However, the fact that functional fixedness can be 
triggered by priming the standard function of novel artefacts, for which participants in the function 
demonstration and control conditions are equated in knowledge about their functions (Defeyter & 
German, 2003), suggests that repeated pairing of tools and functions is not the main cause of this 
phenomenon. Instead, it seems that in humans the information about artefacts is organized around 
the notion of proper function. 
What constitutes the representations of an object function? Providing a precise definition of 
the concept of function has been the focus of much work in philosophy (e.g., Cummins, 1975; 
Scheele, 2006; Vaesen, 2008; Wright, 1973). An important distinction made in this work is the one 
between the system function of a tool and its proper function. On the one hand, the notion of system 
function encompasses all the possible purposes a tool can be used for by an agent. In this basic 
sense of the concept, a function of an artefact corresponds to the causal role it plays within an 
observer-relative overall system (Cummins, 1975). For example, the function of a stapler can be to 
join sheets of paper but, depending on the agent’s current goal, it can also be to work as a 
paperweight. On the other hand, the proper function of a tool refers to a use that is deemed 
privileged, in the sense that is what the tool “is for” (Scheele, 2005; Wright, 1973). For example, 
although a toothbrush can be used to clean many things, its proper function is to clean teeth. 
Importantly, this notion of function is characterized by its social consequences. In particular, proper 
functions are assumed to be conventional (Scheele, 2006) and, once established, they become 
normative (Casler, Terziyan & Greene, 2009; Vaesen, 2008). 
Theories of artefact conceptual representations have focused in these senses of the notion of 
function to a different extent. For example, on the system function side of this literature, the HIPE1 
theory of function (Barsalou, Chaigneau & Sloman, 2005; Chaigneau, Barsalou & Sloman, 2004; 
Chaigneau, Barsalou & Zamani, 2009) proposes that there is no single representation of the function 
of an object. On the contrary, depending on an agent’s reason (at the meta-cognitive level) to access 
knowledge about an object’s function, a “functional sense” is constructed through causal inference 
processes in a given occasion. For example, if the agent is interested in establishing the origin of an 
object (e.g., a anthropologist trying to figure out the original purpose of an ancient artefact), he will 
retrieve a different subset of knowledge than if he is interested in identifying the optimal physical 
features to accomplish an outcome (e.g., a person trying to create an object to scratch his own 
                                                          
1 The acronym HIPE stands for the types of conceptual knowledge that are deemed central to 
represent functions: History, Intentional perspective, Physical environment, and Event sequences. 
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back). Not only these subsets of knowledge would differ, but also the direction of the causal 
inferences made. In the first case (assuming that there no direct information about the artefact’s 
origin), the causal inferences would be diagnostic, meaning that they would be directed backwards 
in a causal model of the artefact features. In the second case, the causal inferences would be 
predictive, that is, they would be directed towards a final outcome in the causal model. Importantly, 
these types of inferences have been confirmed in artefact categorization studies with adults 
(Chaigneau, Barsalou & Sloman, 2004; Puebla & Chaigneau, 2014) and a function choice study 
with children (Kelemen, Seston & Saint Georges, 2012). 
Other theories have focused in explaining the special status of the proper function of an 
artefact (Bloom, 1996, 2000; Kelemen & Carey, 2007). According to the intentional-historical 
theory of artefact categorization (Bloom, 1996, 2000), people assume that members of an artefact 
category are created with a certain common intention. This intention constitutes the essence of 
artefacts, in the sense that it explains their superficial features and determines their category 
membership. In this view, other properties such as physical structure, colour or function are relevant 
to determine an artefact’s category only insofar as they are cues to the creator’s intent. Thus this 
theory ascribes a central role to a designer or creator intention. However, this intention is conceived 
in terms of category membership (i.e., what the object is intended to be) rather than function (i.e., 
the purpose the object is intended to be used for). This emphasis allows the theory to explain the 
category membership of non-operative artefacts (e.g., a broken chair is still a chair although people 
cannot sit on it) and representational artefacts (e.g., a giant chair in a art exhibition is still a chair). 
Kelemen and Carey (2007) present a more specific version of this theory targeted at technical 
artefacts, which are those with instrumental functions (e.g., a chair to sit on) rather than social ones 
(e.g., a throne). For these authors, the intended function is the central factor in people’s conception 
of artefacts because it determines their physical properties and the uses they can serve (i.e., its 
system function). For example, a dinner knife is able to cut foods because that is what it was 
designed for. The physical structure of this tool is constrained by this intention (e.g., blunt handle 
with a sharpened blade) as well as other possible purposes it can be used for (e.g., drive screws). 
Although the knife’s physical structure affords many possible uses, the reason of its existence is the 
intention of the designer that it serves the purpose of cutting foods. 
As illustrated in this discussion, theories about the conceptual representations of artefacts 
have highlighted the causal role of functions. According to the HIPE theory, a function of a tool 
corresponds to an inferred critical variable in a causal inference process (e.g., the sought outcome of 
using a tool or the reason it has certain physical features). In historical-intentional theories, the 
designer’s intention is the cause of the artefact’s existence and physical properties, which explains 
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its importance when deciding what an object is for. These approaches, however, generally overlook 
the normative and conventional aspects of the functions of artefacts. Indeed, in most cases artefact 
functions play the role of a social norm, in the sense that they prescribe right and wrong ways of 
using tools. Casler et al. (2009) have shown that this normativity assumption seems to be in place 
from 2 years of age. Furthermore, artefact functions are generally assumed to be conventional 
practice. As Sieguel and Callanan (2007) point out, because artefacts are objects designed to 
achieve cultural goals, their functions are inherently linked to the conventional practices of a 
community. Previous empirical studies on the importance of social conventions in children and 
adults’ conceptions of artefacts have yielded mixed results (for a review see Chapter 2). In order to 
gain insight into children’s appreciation of the conventional aspect of the functions of artefacts, the 
present thesis will use a new experimental paradigm to gauge the influence of judgments about the 
function of malfunctioning tools. Importantly, this new design will make it possible to compare the 
influence of social conventions on these function judgments with the influence of designer’s intent 
– the most studied determinant of children’s function judgments.     
 
Functional knowledge in typical and atypical tool use 
According to Vaesen (2012), the principal way functional knowledge influences tool use is 
by modulating causal reasoning. The paradigmatic case here is functional fixedness, where priming 
of an object’s typical function prevents further evaluations of other possible but atypical uses for it 
(i.e., the causal roles it can serve in bringing about different goals the person may have at the 
moment). In this thesis my aim was to test the proposal that functional knowledge can also affect 
causal reasoning in situations of typical, yet ineffective, tool use. This hypothesis comes from 
considering how the process of judging the functionality of a tool changes depending on the type of 
information available in working memory. When information about a tool’s proper function is not 
activated in working memory, judgments about its functionality are mostly a matter of causal 
inference, where determining the function of a tool is to identify the goal(s) an object’s physical 
structure allows the user to achieve most efficiently. However, when this information is available in 
working memory (e.g., because it was primed or was spontaneously retrieved), it should lead the 
inferential process. One reason for this is that, in general, people assume artefacts are created with 
physical structures that are optimally efficient for achieving their intended function (Dennett, 1990; 
Kelemen, Seston & Saint Georges, 2012; Vaesen & Amerogen, 2008; but see Chaigneau, Castillo 
& Martínez, 2008). Given this optimality assumption, the default tendency in cases of unsuccessful 
(but proper) tool use would be to attribute the responsibility of the malfunction to the user rather 
than to the tool. In terms of judging the tool’s functionality, this suggests that proper functions 
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should show some degree of resistance to the negative evidence provided by malfunction episodes. 
Additionally, the capacity of social conventions and designer’s intentions to influence judgments of 
function in this way would be diagnostic of their importance in children’s conceptualizations of 
artefacts. 
 
Methodology and objectives of the thesis 
In this thesis I use an experimental procedure based on the ideas presented above to test the 
effect of functional knowledge in children’s judgments of malfunctioning tools. A second goal of 
the thesis was to gauge the importance of designer intentions and social conventions in children’s 
conceptualization of artefacts and how this changes with development. 
The general procedure of the studies presented in this thesis can be described as follows. 
Children were presented with stories about tools that could be used in two equally plausible ways. 
One of these functions was presented as either the conventional function (i.e., everybody used the 
tool in that way) or designed function (i.e., the tool was designed for that function). The alternative 
was presented as a possible function (i.e., although possible, nobody used the tool in the alternative 
way). Subsequently, a different character used the tool in a way that resulted in either malfunction 
or successful tool use. A baseline condition presenting both functions as possible was used to 
establish the raw effect of the malfunction episode. Children were asked to judge the function of the 
tool. 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature in children’s conceptual representations of artefacts and 
their functions. Chapter 3 present the results of a study applying the methodology described in this 
section to 4-to-5 year olds. In order to replicate the results obtained with older children and to 
evaluate possible changes in children’s conceptual representations of artefacts, Chapter 4 uses a 
similar design to test 6- to 7-year olds. Chapter 5 discuss the results of these studies within the 
framework of theories artefacts representations, the relationship of causal reasoning and functional 
knowledge, and the systematicity of human tool use. Finally, future lines of research are suggested. 
 
8 
 
Chapter 2 
 
The development of functional representation 
 
 
The importance of function in children’s representations of artefacts 
As discussed in Chapter 1, functional representation is one of the most important cognitive 
foundations of human tool use. This capacity seems to have its roots in early childhood, as infants 
pay more attention to the functional features of objects compared to non-functional ones (for a 
review, see Oakes & Madole, 2008). For example, Träuble and Pauen (2008) have found that 11-to- 
12-months-olds will look longer at features involved in the production of an outcome (e.g., a t-
shaped part of an artefact used to pull out a red elastic-band) compared to features not related to 
outcomes (e.g. a rounded end with no demonstrated effect) when examining new artefacts. 
A turning point in the development of this faculty occurs around two years of age. At this 
age children start to categorize objects in terms of their functions instead of their external 
appearance (Bloom & Markson, 1998; Diesendruck, Markson & Bloom, 2003; Kemler-Nelson, 
Russell, Duke & Jones, 2000). For example, Kemler-Nelson et al. (2000) presented 2 year olds with 
novel toy-like objects that had simple functions children could understand (e.g. an object with a top 
that could be rotated) and named them (e.g., “This is a Figley”). Children were allowed to explore 
the objects freely but the functions of the objects were not demonstrated. After each novel object 
was introduced children were presented with a pair of test objects, one of which had the same 
function but different appearance than the novel object (e.g., an object with the same shape but 
made as one-piece of material), while the other had a different function but the same appearance 
(e.g., an differently-shaped object with a top that could rotate). Children’s task was to give a puppet 
assistant the object named as the novel object. The results showed that children selected the 
dissimilar but functional objects more frequently than the similar but dysfunctional objects. 
Furthermore, around this age children’s questions about artefacts seem to be targeted to 
figure out their functions (Kemler Nelson, Egan & Holt, 2004; Asher & Kemler Nelson, 2008). For 
example, Asher and Kemler Nelson (2008) presented new artefacts to 3- and 4-year old children. 
Children were prompted to ask about the objects (e.g., “What can I tell you about this?”). Whenever 
children asked either a category (e.g., “What is it?”) or functional question (e.g., “What does this 
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do?”) about an object, an adult experimenter responded by providing either a plausible or 
implausible function. All children seemed dissatisfied with the answer in the second case as they 
asked significantly more follow-up functional questions. 
Functions also affect the consistency of young children’s tool use, making them repeatedly 
choose a tool for a one-time demonstrated function over a suitable alternative. For example, Casler 
and Kelemen (2007) presented 2 year olds with two new equally affordant tools for a function (e.g., 
two differently shaped handled-tools for making a bell ring) and then briefly demonstrated one of 
the tools performing the target function. When asked to perform the function themselves, children 
consistently used the demonstrated tool across two days of testing. Furthermore, under the same 
conditions 2.5- to 4-year olds avoided using the demonstrated tool for a different purpose (e.g., 
crushing crackers; Casler & Kelemen, 2005), revealing a more marked one-tool-one-function 
assumption. Furthermore, functions also affect young children’s social learning of tool use. For 
example, DiYanni and Kelemen (2008) presented groups of 2-, 3- and 4-year old children with an 
adult model who intentionally rejected an optimal tool for a task and selected instead a nonaffordant 
one. When asked to perform the task themselves, children at all ages chose the optimal tool, thus 
overlooking the model intentional clues and departing from their general tendency to imitate an 
adult model’s intentional actions (e.g., Nielsen, 2006). In a follow-up study, when the model made 
it clear that the tool was made for the demonstrated function, 3-year-olds (but not 2- nor 4-year 
olds) increased imitation. Furthermore, when the model chose a suboptimal tool instead of a 
completely nonaffordant one, 2- and 3-year-olds imitated but the 4-year-olds continued to choose 
the optimal tool. 
As this section has illustrated, the notion of function is at the core of children’s early 
representation of artefacts. This is illustrated by children’s early preferential attention to functional 
features (Träuble and Pauen, 2008), their preference to categorize objects in terms of function 
instead of shape (Kemler-Nelson et al., 2000), their questions about artefacts (Kemler Nelson, Egan 
& Holt, 2004; Asher & Kemler Nelson, 2008) and their patterns of tool use and social learning of 
tool use (Casler and Kelemen, 2007; DiYanni & Kelemen, 2008). 
 
The development of the design stance 
Much of the research on the development of children’s conceptual representations of 
artefacts has been based on a theory known as the design stance or the historical-intentional theory 
(Bloom, 1996, 2000; Kelemen & Carey, 2007). In this view, adults and children understand tools in 
terms of their design functions, namely, what they have been made for. In general, the evidence for 
the design stance is weaker for younger children, but much consistent for older children and adults. 
Some previous studies have yielded indirect support for the design stance in young children. For 
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example, Gelman and Bloom (2000) have shown that when presented with a generic illustration of 
an object (e.g., a picture of a sharp piece of plastic), 3-year-olds are more likely to name it as an 
artefact (e.g., “knife”) than as a material (e.g., “plastic”) if the object is depicted as having been 
created intentionally rather than by accident (see also Kemler Nelson, Holt & Egan, 2004). This 
result entails that at age 3 years children are aware of the fact that artefacts are objects intentionally 
created in contrast to natural kinds. At the same time, early research by Bloom and colleagues 
(Bloom & Markson, 1998; Diesendruck, Markson & Bloom, 2003) suggested that at children’s 
preference to extend names to new artefacts on the basis of function rather than shape was a 
consequence of a early understanding of the role that design plays in determining function. 
However, more recent research has shown that any plausible function can lead children to function-
based naming (Truxaw, Woods, Krasnow & German, 2006). 
 Although design information seems not to be privileged in children’s early conception of 
artefacts, research focusing on function inference has shown that they have a developing 
understanding of the ways design constrain an artefact properties, as suggested by the results of 
Kelemen, Seston and Saint Georges (2012). In this study, groups of 3-year-olds, 4-year-olds and 
adults were presented with pairs of objects that shared a common function (e.g., to crush popcorn). 
One of the objects had physical features optimal for accomplishing the function (e.g., a handled 
cylindrical block with a even base) while the alternative was suboptimal (e.g., a similar object with 
ridges in the base that caught popcorn while crushing). An experimenter demonstrated how to use 
the objects after which participants were provided opportunity to explore the objects themselves. 
The task was to indicate which of the objects was made for the demonstrated function. While the 3-
year-olds selected at chance, 4-year-olds and adults selected the optimal tool over the suboptimal 
tool. This result shows that children assume artefacts have physical features that are optimally 
suited for achieving the function they were made for. In a second study, 3-year-olds, 4-year-olds 
and adults were presented with pairs of objects that were equally optimal for achieving a function, 
however one of the objects had additional features suggestive of an alternative (but not 
demonstrated) function. As in the previous study, both objects were demonstrated performing the 
shared function and participants explored the objects themselves. Again, participants’ task was to 
indicate which of the objects was made for the demonstrated function. Participants in all age groups 
tended to select the more specific tool. Thus, this result suggest that from 3 years of age children 
recognize that artefacts are generally designed for serving a single function. 
It is worth to note that while the study of Kelemen, Seston and Saint Georges (2012) shows 
that children can infer intentional design from the mechanical properties of artefacts, it does not 
show that children privilege design functions over other possible functions. Evidence for such a 
preference has come from task requiring explicit function or categorization judgments (Defeyter, 
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Hearing & German, 2009; German & Johnson, 2002; Matan & Carey, 2001; Kelemen, 1999; 
Jaswal, 2006). For example, Kelemen (1999) told 4- to 5-year-olds and adults stories involving a 
novel artefact that was designed to perform a function (e.g., stretch out clothes), but then was used 
by somebody else for another purpose (e.g., exercise the character’s bad back). When asked to 
judge what the artefacts were for, children and adults favoured the design functions even if the 
alternative functions constituted a recurrent activity. Although Kelemen (1999) documented this 
effect in 4- to 5-year-olds, several later studies have found that the dominance of designer intentions 
emerges later, at around 6 years of age or later (Matan & Carey, 2001; Defeyter, Hearing & 
German, 2009; German & Johnson 2002). For example, Matan and Carey (2001), presented 4- and 
6-year-olds with stories where someone intentionally created an object to serve one function (e.g., 
watering flowers) but later an opportunistic agent used the object for a different function (e.g., 
making tea). When asked what the object was (e.g., a watering can or a tea pot), 6-year-olds, but not 
4-year-olds followed the design function more often than the current use. Regardless of this 
controversy, the prevalence of design functions is a robust phenomenon in adults (Chaigneau 
Barsalou & Sloman, 2004; Chaigneau, Castillo & Martínez, 2008; Puebla & Chaigneau, 2014) and 
it has been documented even in a technologically sparse culture (Barrett, Laurence & Margolis, 
2008). 
This tendency to construe artefacts in terms of the goals or functions their creators intended 
them be used for has been argued to lead towards the critical phenomenon of functional fixedness. 
In support of this view, Defeyter and German (2003; German & Deyfeter, 2000) have shown that 
priming children with a tool-typical function worsens 7-year-olds (but not 5-year-olds) performance 
when required to solve a problem by using the tool in an unconventional manner, this occurs 
because younger children have not yet developed the relevant conceptual system that constrains 
older children’s reasoning about artefact functions (i.e., the design stance). This interference also 
works contrariwise: demonstrating the original intended function of a tool makes it harder for 7- 
year-olds (but not for 5-year-olds) to generate multiple different functions for a tool (Defeyter, 
Avons & German, 2007). However, it is worth noting that in the functional fixedness studies of 
Defeyter and German (2003; German & Deyfeter, 2000) knowledge of the designer’s intention was 
not directly manipulated as the procedure only specified the typical use of the tools. In fact, 
Kelemen and Carey (2007) have proposed that these results could be more related to the 
development of children’s understanding of conventionality than to changes in artefact concepts. 
This is due primarily to the null results of an unpublished study (Kelemen, 2001, as cited in 
Kelemen and Carey, 2007) where the relationship between children’s preference for design 
functions in a function judgments task and functional fixedness was examined. However, even if the 
tendency to construe artefacts in terms of their design functions does not correlate with functional 
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fixedness, I think that the difference between the priming and not priming conditions of Defeyter 
and German points to a developmental difference in children’s artefact concepts. The point is that 
the component of the conceptual system that is triggering this effect might be other than designer’s 
intentions. In particular, recent research has highlighted the role of social conventions in of 
children’s conceptual understanding of artefacts. The next section will examine this aspect.  
As this section has illustrated, at the age of 3 years children are able to infer design from the 
mechanical properties of tools (Kelemen, Seston & Saint Georges, 2012 Experiment 1) and they 
recognize that, generally, artefacts are associated with a unique function (Kelemen, Seston & Saint 
Georges, 2012 Experiment 2), although this privileged function becomes preferentially associated 
with the designer’s intent only at the age of 6 years or later (Matan & Carey, 2001; Defeyter, 
Hearing & German, 2009; German & Johnson 2002; Truxaw et al., 2006). This weighting of 
intended design in children’s conceptualization of artefacts has been deemed to lead older children 
(and adults) to show functional fixedness. However there is some evidence that people’s 
understanding of the role that social conventions plays in determining the proper function of tool 
may play a role in this phenomenon. The next section will review the research in this area. 
 
The social dimension of artefact functions 
An important aspect of children’s understanding of artefacts that has gained attention in the 
literature is the conventional nature of their functions. As work in philosophy has highlighted, there 
are proper and improper ways of using a tool, which are determined in part by implicit agreements 
on their functions (Scheele, 2005). In line with this idea, children exhibit an early awareness of the 
normative implications of artefact functions. For example, Casler et al. (2009), taught 2- and 3-
yearolds the functions of several tools. When a puppet subsequently used the tools for a function 
other than the one taught children exhibited more spontaneous normative responses (e.g., protesting, 
tattling, teaching), than in a control condition where the puppet used the tool in the demonstrated 
manner. 
In order to establish the relative importance of social conventions in children’s conceptions 
of artefacts, researchers have pitted conventionality against designer intentions. For example, Siegel 
and Callanan (2007) have shown that when confronted with a decision between a design function 
and a current conventional function (e.g., a tool designed for trapping bugs but now used by 
everybody to collect raindrops), 5- and 7-year-olds and adults choose each function equally often. 
More recently, Defeyter et al. (2009, Study 1) reported that when asked to judge function (i.e., 
“What is it really for?”), 4- and 6-year-olds had no preference between a design function and a 
current function, either when the current function was idiosyncratic or conventional. However, 
when asked to make category membership judgments of the same objects (i.e., “What is it really?), 
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4- and 6-year-olds responded according to the design function when the current use was 
idiosyncratic, but showed no preference when the current use was conventional (Defeyter et al., 
2009 Study 2). Adults showed the known bias toward the design function with both kinds of 
questions. 
A different approach to study the influence of social conventions in children’s understanding 
of artefacts was taken by Seston Schillaci and Kelemen (2014). In this experiment 3- and 4-year-
olds watched a video in which two informants disagreed with a lone dissenter on the function of a 
novel artefact. The function supported by the majority could be as plausible as the function 
supported by the dissenter (weak trials), or implausible while the minority function was plausible 
(strong trials). Children’s task was to state what they thought the object was for. In the weak trials, 
3- and 4-year olds’ answers were at chance. However, in the strong trials the 4-year-olds eschewed 
the functions supported by the majority while the 3-year-olds showed no preference. In a follow-up 
study, increasing the salience of the consensus of the majority augmented the 3-year-olds’ 
preference for the majority in the weak trials, but did not affect the tendency of the 4-year-old 
children to eschew the majority in the strong trials. Thus this study suggests that social conventions 
are progressively less important to determine the functions of tools with age and that to have an 
effect of function judgments these conventions have to be plausible in light of an artefact’s physical 
properties. 
More recent research, however, has shown cultural differences in children’s susceptibility to 
the majority opinion about artefact function. In particular, DiYanni, Corriveau, Kurkul, Nasrini, and 
Nini (2015) tested Caucasian-American children and Chinese-American children in conditions 
where either one model or three models chose an inefficient novel artefact over a more efficient 
alternative to perform a function. Children were asked which artefact would they need to perform 
the function themselves. Most Caucasian-American children chose the more efficient alternative. 
The Chinese-American children were, however, more likely to choose the inefficient artefact.  
As these studies illustrate, research on the importance of social conventions in children’s 
conception of artefacts has yielded mixed results. On the one hand, the contrast of conventional 
functions with design functions shows that social conventions are weighted as strongly as 
designer’s intent in young children’s function judgments. However, as discussed previously, given 
that design functions don’t seem to be privileged in function judgments before the age of 6 years or 
later, this seems to indicate that social conventions are yet another relevant cue to function, but not 
a privileged one. On the other hand, when contrasted with the physical/mechanical properties of 
artefacts social conventions seem to prevail, but only when children come from a cultural 
background that promotes strong compliance to cultural norms. Despite this mixed evidence, 
children seem aware of the normative aspect of artefact functions from early in life.  
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These results highlight the necessity to clarify the role that social conventions play in 
children’s understanding of artefacts. The present thesis will add to this research by testing the 
importance of social conventions and designer’s intent with a new experimental paradigm. 
Importantly, this new procedure will allow a direct comparison in of the influence of these variables 
in children’s conceptualization of artefacts across age groups. 
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Chapter 3 
Four-to-5-year-olds assessments of ineffective tool 
use 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, functional knowledge is important for tool use because it 
constrains inferences about the possible uses of artefacts. In particular, as illustrated by the 
phenomenon of functional fixedness, function representation modulates causal reasoning in 
situations of atypical tool use. In the current study I sought to show that functional knowledge not 
only regulates causal reasoning when using tools in unusual ways, but also when evaluating typical 
(yet ineffective) tool use. A second goal of this study is to inform the ongoing debate about the 
relative importance of social conventions and designer’s intentions in children’s attributions of 
functions to artefacts (Defeyter, Hearing & German, 2009; Seston Schillaci & Kelemen, 2014; 
Siegel & Callanan, 2007). 
To accomplish this I built on a study by Chaigneau and Puebla (2013), where adult 
participants were told a story about tool called a “Figure-8” (a simple 8-shaped device used in 
mountaineering) that had two possible functions: abseiling (to prevent falling while ascending) and 
belaying (to control descending by using friction). Critically, all participants in the study learned 
about a specific episode in which an individual used the Figure-8 for one of its possible functions 
and had an accident. In four different conditions the function associated with the accident was (1) 
designed; (2) conventional; (3) designed and conventional; or (4) neither designed nor conventional. 
When asked about the real function of the tool, participants considered the function involved in the 
accident to be the real function of the tool only when it was used as designed. Thus, presenting 
information about the designer intention constrained adults’ efficiency evaluations that rendered the 
accident function implausible in the conditions not including this information. 
In the present study I tested 4- to 5-year olds. This age group was selected because of two 
related reasons. In the first place, as mentioned before, studies using categorization and function 
judgment measures have yielded mixed results regarding the importance of design functions in 
children’s conceptualizations of artefacts; therefore I sought to inform that debate by testing design 
functions’ importance using a different approach. In the second place, Casler et al. (2009) found 
that from 2 years of age children expect others to conform to the known uses of tools, suggesting 
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that a conventionality assumption could be an early component of children’s artefact concepts. 
Participants were presented with a story about a tool that could be used in two equally 
plausible ways, one of which constituted either its conventional or designed function. Subsequently, 
an attempt to use the tool by a new character resulted in either malfunction or successful tool use. 
At the end of the story children were asked about the function of the tool (“What do you think this 
is really for?”). Additionally, a baseline condition only stating the two possible functions but with 
no information about conventionality or design, was used to establish the raw impact of the 
malfunction episode. It was predicted that in the baseline condition the malfunction episode would 
render the function involved implausible, leading participants to choose the alternative function as 
the real function of the tool. Given the modulating effect of functional knowledge on causal 
reasoning, it was predicted that designed and/or conventional functions would be less affected by 
the malfunction episode compared to the baseline condition. Furthermore, differential effects of the 
malfunction manipulation across types of functions would suggest a difference on the importance of 
these variables in children’s conception of artefacts. 
Method 
Participants 
Eighty 4- to 5-year olds (42 males, M = 4.5 years, SD = 0.5, range = 3.9-5.5) were included 
in this study. Children were assigned randomly to one of five experimental conditions (16 per 
condition). An additional 9 children were tested but not included in the main analyses because of 
experimenter error (n = 3), because they failed control questions (n = 4) or because they did not 
engaged in the task (n = 2). All children were recruited from an existing participant pool. Parents 
were contacted via mail, email, or telephone, and those interested in volunteering brought their 
children to dedicated child-friendly test rooms at a large metropolitan university. Children were 
predominantly Caucasian living in suburbs surrounding the university. All children received a small 
gift for participating at the end of the session. 
Materials 
The stimuli consisted of line drawings of four tools adapted from Defeyter et al. (2009). The 
drawings were designed such that every tool had two equally plausible functions that could result in 
equally plausible malfunction episodes. Table 1 shows the four tools together with their functions 
and malfunction episodes. Additional pictures of a group of people, a female and male designer, and 
four female and male users are presented in Figure 1. All illustrations were presented on an iPad. 
Procedure 
Upon arrival, children were escorted with their parents to a warm-up room, where parents 
were given a consent form to sign and provided with further information concerning their child’s 
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participation. Once children appeared comfortable with the test environment and the experimenter, 
they were brought with their parent(s) to an adjacent test room.  
Once in the test room, the child and the experimenter sat at a table in front of each other, 
with an iPad facing the child placed 50 cm equidistant between them. Then, the experimenter told 
the child that he had some pictures on the iPad and he was going to tell the child some stories. After 
this the experimenter proceeded to tell the stories and present the corresponding pictures 
accordingly to one of the following five conditions: 
Convention with malfunction: In this condition there were four trials involving a novel tool 
with two functions. One of the functions was described as conventional and the other as possible 
(i.e., although possible, the tool was never depicted being used in the alternative way). In order to 
ensure that both functions were equally plausible, their affordances were made explicit by the 
pictures and explained briefly. For example, the script for the “toma” in this condition was as 
follows: “Look at this. This thing is called a toma. Everybody uses it for catching fish and it is good 
for this. This is where the fish goes so you can catch them. Nobody uses the toma for carrying 
bottles, but it is also good for this. This is where you can put the bottles so you can carry them”. 
Once the conventional and the alternative functions were established, there were two memory-
check questions about the functions (e.g., “Do you remember what everybody uses a toma for? “Do 
you remember what nobody uses the toma for?”). If a child answered incorrectly, the story was 
repeated and the child was asked once more. Two children were replaced after not passing the 
control question in their second attempt. After the memory-check, a new character was described 
trying but failing to use the tool for its conventional function, without causing harm to himself or 
anybody else (e.g., “One day, one person tried to use the toma for catching fish, but all the fish 
jumped out of the toma and he couldn’t catch any fish. After that, the same person tried to use the 
toma for carrying bottles and he was able to carry bottles with it”). After the malfunction episode, 
participants were asked about the real function of the tool (i.e., “What do you think the toma is 
really for? Is it really for catching fish or for carrying bottles?”). The pictures illustrating the 
malfunction episodes were designed to make clear that the users’ actions were typical but the 
outcome was unsuccessful (see Table 1). The character involved in the malfunction episode was 
different for each trial but the crowd was always the same (see Figure 1). 
Design with malfunction: This condition was identical to the convention with malfunction 
condition save the fact that one of the functions was described as designed instead of conventional 
(as per the convention condition the alternative was described as a possible function). For example, 
the script for the toma in this condition was as follows: “Look at this. This thing is called a toma. 
Peter made the toma for catching fish and is good for this. This is where the fish go so you can 
catch them. Peter didn’t make the toma for carrying bottles, but it is also good for this. This is 
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where you can put the bottles so you can carry them. Do you remember what Peter made the toma 
for? Do you remember what Peter didn’t make the toma for? One day, one person tried to use the 
toma for catching fish, but all the fish jumped out of the toma and he couldn’t catch any fish. After 
that, the same person tried to use the toma for carrying bottles and he was able to carry bottles with 
it. What do you think the toma is really for? Is it really for catching fish or for carrying bottles?” 
Convention without malfunction: This condition was identical to the convention with 
malfunction condition except that there was no malfunction episode. For example: “Look at this. 
This thing is called a toma. Everybody uses it for catching fish and is good for this. This is where 
the fish goes so you can catch them. Nobody uses the toma for carrying bottles, but it is also good 
for this. This is where you can put the bottles so you can carry them. Do you remember what 
everybody uses a toma for? Do you remember what nobody uses the toma for? What do you think 
the toma is really for? Is it really for catching fish or for carrying bottles?” 
Design without malfunction: This condition was identical to the design with malfunction 
condition except that there was no malfunction episode. For example: “Look at this. This thing is 
called a toma. Peter made the toma for catching fish and is good for this. This is where the fish 
goes so you can catch them. Peter didn’t make the toma for carrying bottles, but it is also good for 
this. This is where you can put the bottles so you can carry them. Do you remember what Peter 
made the toma for? Do you remember what Peter didn’t make the toma for? What do you think the 
toma is really for? Is it really for catching fish or for carrying bottles?” 
Baseline: In this condition both functions were established as possible without making any 
reference to conventionality or design. There were no memory-check questions. Importantly the use 
attempt in this condition always resulted in malfunction. For example: “Look at this. This thing is 
called a toma. A toma is good for catching fish. This is where the fish goes so you can catch them. A 
toma is also good for carrying bottles. This is where you can put the bottles so you can carry them. 
One day, one person tried to use the toma for catching fish, but all the fish jumped out of the toma 
and he couldn’t catch any fish. After that, the same person tried to use the toma for carrying bottles 
and he was able to carry bottles with it. What do you think the toma is really for? Is it really for 
catching fish or for carrying bottles?” 
For all conditions, the order of presentation of the tools was randomized across participants. 
Additionally, the order of presentation of the functions for each tool was counterbalanced between 
participants. For all conditions except baseline, the specific function assigned to each role 
(conventional/designed or alternative) within each condition was counterbalanced between 
participants. As a control for possible gender-based biases in evaluations of tool use or creation, the 
gender of the characters involved in the stories was matched with the participant’s gender in all 
conditions.  
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Tool Function A  Malfunction A Function B  Malfunction B 
Dax 
 
 
 
Throwing balls 
 
 
 
Ball gets stuck in the dax 
 
 
 
Digging in the sand 
 
 
 
Sand gets stuck in the dax 
 
 
 
Tog 
 
 
 
Grabbing fruit from trees 
 
 
 
Fruit slip under the top 
 
 
 
Breaking the soil 
 
 
 
Soil is too hard  
 
 
 
Toma 
 
 
 
Catching fish  
 
 
 
Fish jump out of the toma 
 
 
 
Carrying bottles 
 
 
 
Bottles fell out of the toma 
 
 
 
Zig 
 
 
 
 
Gathering fruit 
 
 
 
Fruit fell out of the zig  
 
 
 
Sliding in a rope 
 
 
 
Zig gets stuck in the rope 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Illustrations of tools and corresponding functions and malfunctions. 
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Crowd 
  
 
Designers 
    
 
Users 
        
 
 
Figure 1. Additional characters used in the stories. 
 
Coding 
In the baseline, convention with malfunction, and design with malfunction conditions 
participants received a score of 1 each time they chose the malfunctioning function and zero 
otherwise. In the convention without malfunction and design without malfunction conditions 
participants received a score of 1 each time they chose the conventional or designed function and 
zero otherwise. This coding system allowed making direct comparisons between the different 
conditions. For example, as in the convention with malfunction condition the function involved in 
the accident was always the conventional function, and in the convention without malfunction 
condition the same functions were conventional but were not involved in the malfunction episode, 
our system scored 1 each time a person chose the conventional function in both conditions. The 
same equivalence holds for the design with malfunction and design without malfunction conditions. 
Critically for our experimental design, this system simultaneously scored 1 each time a person 
chose the function involved in the malfunction condition in all conditions featuring a malfunction 
episode. 
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Results 
Means and confidence intervals for each condition are shown in Figure 2. Preliminary 
analysis showed that none of the order factors had a significant influence on participant’s responses 
nor interacted with the experimental manipulations. These variables are therefore not considered 
further. In order to establish the raw effect of the malfunction manipulation and to have an initial 
evaluation of each condition, two-tailed one-sample t-tests against chance (defined as a score of 2 
out of 4) were conducted. This analysis revealed that the convention without malfunction condition 
scored higher than chance, M = 2.94, SE = .35, t(15) = 2.70, p = .02, whereas the design without 
malfunction was not different from chance, M = 2.56, SE = .27, t(15) = 2.06, p = .06. Neither the 
convention with malfunction condition nor the design with malfunction conditions were different 
from chance, M = 2.56, SE = .41, t(15) = 1.38, p = .19; M = 1.81, SE = .37, t(15) = -.51, p = .62 
(respectively). Critically for the experimental design, the baseline condition scored significantly 
lower than chance, M = 1.13, SE = .33, t(15) = -2.67, p = .02, thus participants in this condition 
avoided the malfunctioning function when there was no information about conventionality or 
design.  
 
Figure 2. Mean number of critical function selections for Experiment 1. Error bars represent 
standard errors. 
 
Having established the raw effect of the malfunction manipulation, a one-way ANOVA 
showed that children’s tendency to select the malfunctioning function differed significantly between 
conditions, F(4, 75) = 4.37, p = 0.03, partial η2 = .19. Dunnett’s two-tailed tests showed that the 
convention without malfunction, design without malfunction, and convention with malfunction 
conditions were higher than the baseline condition, all ps < .05, whereas the design with 
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malfunction condition did not differ from baseline, p = .437. This suggests that conventional 
functions, but not design functions, were less affected by the malfunction manipulation compared to 
possible functions. 
 
Discussion 
To our knowledge, this is the first study to show that functional information can affect 
assessments of typical but ineffective tool use in children. In the baseline condition the malfunction 
episode counted as evidence against the effectiveness of the tool to perform the critical function, 
which led participants to disregard it as the function of the tool. However, when the critical function 
was conventional participants ignored the negative evidence provided by the malfunction episode 
choosing the ineffective function as the real function of the tool. In contrast, information about 
designer’s intentions did not affect children’s tendency to avoid the ineffective function nor did it 
seem to have a strong influence on children’s judgments when the design function worked well and 
the alternative was just a possible function. This last result is consistent with previous studies 
showing that designer intentions don’t influence function judgments until the age of 6 or later 
(Defeyter et al., 2009; German & Johnson, 2002; Matan & Carey, 2001) and inconsistent with 
Kelemen (1999) who found an effect of designer’s intentions from the age of 4. It is possible that 
this lack of effect of designer intentions was related to the type of question used in this study, as 
Defeyter et al. (2009) have reported that this variable shows its effect at earlier ages when measured 
with categorization judgments (i.e., “What is this?”) than when measured with function judgment 
(i.e., “What is this for”). Taken together, these results are in line with previous research showing 
that social conventions are an important part of children’s conceptions of artefacts and their 
functions (Siegel & Callanan, 2007).  
A potential issue with this interpretation of our results is that the effect of social conventions 
could correspond to a general social learning effect (e.g., a majority bias) instead of a conceptual 
one. However this possibility seems unlikely, as previous studies have shown that children’s 
functional knowledge affects their social learning biases in tool use situations (DiYanni & Kelemen, 
2008; Seston Schillaci & Kelemen, 2014; Wilks, Collier-Baker & Nielsen, in press). In particular, 
Seston Schillaci and Kelemen (2014) have shown that 4-year-olds are able to resist the social 
influence of a majority supporting an implausible function for a tool. Therefore, the majority bias 
does not appear to affect children’s tool selection when the function validated by the majority is 
inconsistent with tool affordances. This suggest that to have an effect in function judgments, social 
conventions have to be coherent with other elements of an artefact representation, such as their 
physical structure, affordances and purpose or function (see also Barsalou, Chaigneau & Sloman, 
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2005). Although there is evidence that children with a collectivistic cultural background are more 
susceptible to a majority bias (DiYanni et al., 2015). The sample in this study was predominantly 
from a Western cultural background, which again makes a majority-bias-explanation of the present 
results unlikely. It also raises the possibility that an even stronger bias towards the conventional use 
of the artefacts would be found if this experiment were run in a collectivist culture. This presents 
itself as a topic for future research.  
Another potential minor concern is that children in the convention with malfunction and 
design with malfunction conditions received necessarily more information in the stories than in the 
rest of the conditions, which could explain the difference between these conditions and the 
conditions not featuring a malfunction episode. However, given that children in the convention with 
malfunction and design with malfunction conditions scored differently this possibility seems 
unlikely.  
A critical question is the relationship between the present finding and functional fixedness. 
At first glance these two phenomena seem analogous, since in both of them the activation of the 
typical function of a tool in working memory precludes causal assessments of tool use that would 
occur in other circumstances. However, the effects reported here emerged earlier than the functional 
fixedness documented in 7-year-olds by Defeyter and German (2003), which suggests a different 
developmental path. A related issue is that although Defeyter and German interpreted their results 
in terms of the design stance, their study did not directly manipulate children’s knowledge of 
designer’s intentions, as their procedure only specified the typical use of the tools. Therefore it is 
unknown what piece of conceptual knowledge about artefact functions (i.e., social conventions, 
designer’s intentions or another factor) promoted this effect. Given that the present study found that 
social conventions rather than designer intentions impaired causal reasoning, it is possible that the 
social convention associated with the function of a tool, rather than its designed function is the main 
factor behind this phenomenon. A possibility for future research is to test children in functional 
fixedness tasks where the typical function of the critical artefacts is established through either 
information about conventionality or the designer´s intention. 
Another possible line of future research is to test the effects reported in the present study 
with more hands on procedures. For example, according to the present results, social conventions 
should be able to influence children’s persistence when learning to use tools that require the 
mastery of complex skills, and therefore can easily result in malfunction at the beginning of the 
learning process (designer intentions could trigger this same kind of effect in older children and 
adults). 
To sum up, in the present study I have shown that just as functional knowledge can affect 
causal judgments of typical tool use, it can also affect causal reasoning in situations of typical, yet 
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ineffective, tool use in children. Although much research is needed before establishing the strength 
and reach of this effect on tool use, I think that it is possible that it plays a role in the acquisition of 
technical knowledge necessary for the emergence of the technological traditions characteristic of 
human societies. 
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Chapter 4 
Six- to 8-year-olds assessments of ineffective tool 
use 
 
 
According to the results presented in Chapter 3, functional information can affect proper 
function judgments of malfunctioning tools in 4- to 5-year old children. However, contrary to the 
results of Chaigneau and Puebla (2013), social conventions rather than designer intentions triggered 
this effect, which suggest a developmental difference in the information that is able to interfere with 
causal reasoning in this context. Given that previous research has found designer’s intentions start 
to dominate children’s explicit function judgments around the age of 6 or later (Defeyter, et al., 
2009; German & Johnson, 2002; Matan & Carey, 2001, but see Kelemen, 1999 and Jaswal, 2006), 
in this study I applied the procedure used in Chapter 3 to 6- to 8-year-old children. Another reason 
for testing older children was that the Seston, Schillaci and Kelemen (2014) suggest that social 
conventions become a less important criterion for determining the function of artefacts with age. As 
in Chapter 3, I asked whether presenting functional information would constrain children’s 
assessments of ineffective tool use and, if so, whether this effect would be triggered by information 
about social conventions, designer intentions, or both. Moreover, in order to have a comprehensive 
comparison between designer’s intent and conventionality, this study included an additional 
condition where one of the functions was conventional while the other was designed and there was 
not a malfunction episode (as in Defeyter et al., 2009 and Siegel & Callanan, 2007). This sought to 
test the possibility of a tie between conventional functions and design functions when pitted against 
each other, but only with one type function being resistant to the malfunction manipulation. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Eighty-four 6-to-8 year olds (45 females, M = 6.7 years, SD = .5, range = 5.9-7.9) were 
recruited from a primary school in a large, metropolitan city (n = 20) or from an existing participant 
pool (n = 64). There were no statistically significant differences in age or gender between these 
groups. At the school, the director’s permission was obtained and parents were contacted by mail. 
Only children whose parents granted consent participated in this study.  These children were tested 
in a quiet space separated from their class. For the children obtained through the participant pool, 
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parents were contacted via mail, email, or telephone, and those interested in volunteering brought 
their children to a dedicated, child-friendly test room at a large metropolitan university. Participants 
were predominantly Caucasian living in suburbs of a metropolitan area. Children were assigned 
randomly to one of the six experimental conditions (14 children per condition). All participants 
received a small gift at the end of the session. 
Materials 
The same coloured drawings used in Chapter 3 were used (see Table 1 and Figure 1). Also 
as in Chapter 3 all illustrations were presented on an iPad. 
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as Chapter 3, except that an additional condition was included. 
In the convention versus design condition one function was described as conventional while the 
other as designed and there was no malfunction episode. For example, the script for the “tog” in this 
condition was as follows: “Look at this. This thing is called a tog. Everybody uses the tog for 
breaking the soil and it is good for this. This is where the tog breaks the soil so you can put plans 
in. Peter made the tog for grabbing fruit from trees, and it is also good for this. This is where the 
fruit gets caught so you can pull downwards and grab it. Do you remember what everybody uses 
the tog for? Do you remember what Peter made make the tog for? What do you think the tog is 
really for? Is it really for breaking the soil or for grabbing fruit from trees?” 
The same order and gender controls applied in Chapter 3 were applied in this study. 
Coding 
Participant’s answers were coded in the same way as Chapter 3. Additionally, in the 
convention versus design condition participants received a score of 1 each time they chose the 
design function.  
 
Results 
Figure 3 presents the means and standard errors of the mean for each condition. Preliminary 
analysis showed that there was no effect on participant’s responses of the order of presentation of 
the tools, the order of presentation of the functions for each tool, or the role assigned to each 
function. These variables are not considered further. In order to establish the raw effect of the 
malfunction manipulation and to have an initial evaluation of each condition, two-tailed one-sample 
t-tests against chance (defined as a score of 2 out of 4) were conducted. This analysis revealed that 
participants in the baseline condition scored significantly lower than chance, M = .86, SE = .25, 
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t(13) = -4.50, p < .01. Thus participants avoided the function involved in the malfunction episode 
when there was no information about conventionality or design. Participants in the convention 
without malfunction and design without malfunction conditions scored higher than chance, M = 
2.93, SE = .38, t(13) = 2.41, p = .03; M = 3.14, SE = .31, t(13) = 3.66, p < .01 (respectively), which 
suggests that conventional functions and design functions were preferred when the alternative was a 
possible function. Neither the convention with malfunction condition nor the design with 
malfunction condition were different from chance, M = 2, SE = .51, t(13) = 0, p > .99; M = 1.43, SE 
= .48, t(13) = -1.20, p = .25 (respectively), suggesting that the malfunction manipulation had a 
weaker effect in these two conditions compared to the baseline. Finally, the convention versus 
design condition did not differ from chance, M = 1.86, SE = .39, t(13) = -.37, p = .72, suggesting 
that participants weighted conventional and design functions equally when pitted against each other. 
 
Figure 3. Mean number of critical function selections. Error bars represent standard errors. 
In order to have a more direct comparison with the baseline condition, all conditions except 
convention versus design were submitted to a one-way ANOVA. This analysis yielded a significant 
effect of condition, F(4, 65) = 5.89, p < 0.01, partial η2 = .27. Dunnett’s two-tailed tests against the 
baseline showed that the convention without malfunction and design without malfunction 
conditions were higher than the baseline, ps < .05, whereas the convention with malfunction and 
design with malfunction conditions were not different from the baseline, p = .15 and p = .71 
(respectively). Thus, the comparisons against chance suggest that social conventions and designer 
intentions affected children’s judgments of malfunctioning tools. However, by the non-significant 
results of the comparisons against the baseline condition show that these effects are weaker than the 
effect of social conventions found in Chapter 3.  
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Discussion 
The present results show that functional knowledge can constrain evaluations of typical but 
ineffective tool use in 6- to 8-year-olds. Consistent with previous research highlighting the 
importance of designer’s intentions and social conventions in children’s conceptions of artefacts 
(Defeyter et al., 2009; German & Johnson, 2002; Kelemen, 1999; Matan & Carey, 2001; Siegel & 
Callanan, 2007), participants preferred conventional and design functions over ‘possible’ functions 
at levels above chance when there was no malfunction episode. At the same time, participants were 
sensitive to the malfunction manipulation, eschewing the ineffective functions when there was no 
information about conventionality or design. This suggests that the malfunction episode counted as 
evidence against the effectiveness of the tool for the function intended by the user. However, when 
the same functions were conventional or designed participant choices were at chance, reflecting an 
interference of functional knoweldge on participants’ assessments of tool use. 
These findings differ from the ones presented in Chapter 3, where only conventional 
functions triggered this effect in 4- to 5-year-olds, and from the ones of Chaigneau and Puebla 
(2013), who reported that only the design function of a tool was resistant to the negative evidence 
provided by an accident. The fact that participants had no preference when conventional and design 
functions were pitted against each other reinforces the interpretation that both variables were 
important for this age group. Taken together, the results of these three studies suggest a 
developmental path that goes from an early prominence of social conventions to a late dominance 
of designer’s intentions, with a intermediate period were both of these variables influence 
judgments of artefact functions. Our findings highlight the need of a theory that integrates people’s 
design-based attribution of functions to artefacts with a conventionality assumption. Why the 
conventionality assumption seems to emerge first and then to take a secondary place in favour of 
the assumption that artefacts are for what they have been designed is a question to answer for future 
research. 
Given that effect of function cues in this study was smaller than those found in Chapter 3, a 
possible concern is that the difference in the general pattern of results between these two studies is a 
consequence of older children being more sensitive to the malfunction manipulation, which would 
result in older children paying less attention to the information about convention and design. If that 
were the case, however, one would expect a bigger effect of the malfunction manipulation in the 
baseline condition. In order to test this alternative explanation of the pattern of results across studies 
an independent samples t-test compared the function judgments in the baseline conditions of both 
studies. This analysis did not find a significant difference between the conditions, t(28) = .63, p > 
.05. Therefore, a greater sensitivity to the malfunction episode in older children is likely not the best 
explanation for the present results. 
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An important issue to explore for future research is the relationship between the present 
results and functional fixedness. Given that in both of these phenomena an interference with causal 
reasoning seems to be underlying the results, maybe the same factors that constrained children’s 
assessments of ineffective tool use in this study could also trigger functional fixedness. As 
discussed previously, the functional fixedness studies of Defeyter and German (2003; German & 
Deyfeter, 2000) established only the typical function of tools, which makes unclear what factor 
triggered this effect in 7-year-olds. Explicitly manipulating information about social conventions 
and designer’s intentions in functional fixedness studies could shed light on this issue. 
These results have potential consequences for our understanding of the development of 
persistence in children’s tool use. Human technological traditions are saturated with tools that 
require the mastery of complex skills. This can easily result in cases of malfunction throughout the 
learning process. According to the present findings, information about the conventionality of the 
use of a tool and the designer’s intentions promote a certain amount of tolerance to failure when 
observing someone using a tool –and potentially when using a tool oneself. In order to test this 
hypothesis, future research should employ novel real tools in observational learning situations. 
Previous research has shown that children’s tool use learning is highly sensitive to the behaviour 
and characteristics of adult models (e.g., Nielsen, 2006; Wilks, Collier-Baker & Nielsen, in press). 
Functional information could act in addition to or interactively with these kind of social learning 
biases. In fact, there is evidence suggesting that this might be the case. For example, DiYanni and 
Kelemen (2008) have shown that 2- to 4-year-olds will not imitate an adult model who intentionally 
rejects an optimal tool for a task in favour of a nonaffordant one (but sometimes they will if they are 
told that the tool was made for the task). Additionally, Seston Schillaci and Kelemen (2014) have 
shown that 4-year-olds will resist the social influence of a majority supporting an implausible 
function for a tool (though more recent research has shown that this resistance holds for Caucasian-
American children but not for Chinese-American children; DiYanni et al., 2015). In these two cases 
the functions referred mainly to the affordances of the tools, however, I expect similar effects of 
conventional and design function in children’s performance with real tools (as far as the functions 
are coherent with artefact’s physical structures). 
To sum up, the results reported here supports the idea that functional information can affect 
proper function judgments of malfunctioning tools in 6-8-year olds. In contrast to past research 
showing that 4- to 5-year-olds are only sensitive to social conventions (Chapter 3), and adults who 
are sensitive only to design intentions (Chaigneau & Puebla, 2013), the children tested here were 
sensitive to both social conventions and designer intentions. I think that this pattern of results 
reflects a conceptual trajectory that goes from an early emergence of a conventionality assumption 
about tool functions to an adult conception of tools organized around the notion of design function. 
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Future research will elucidate whether the effects reported in this study play a role in the emergence 
of human technological traditions. 
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Chapter 5 
Discussion 
 
 
The purpose of the current thesis was to investigate the influence of functional knowledge 
on children’s assessments of inefficient tool use. By concentrating on assessments of inefficient (but 
typical) tool use I sought to assess children’s causal inferences in this context. At the same time this 
strategy allowed me to compare, using a novel approach, the influence of social conventions and 
designers’ intentions, two variables deemed critical in children’s conceptual representations of 
artefacts. The research presented in Chapter 3 documented that when children aged 4 to 5 years 
were asked to choose one of two possible functions of tools, they eschewed ineffective uses and 
chose effective uses instead. However, when the ineffective uses were conventional, children 
choose them over the effective ones. In order to extend these results to an older age group and to 
capture developmental changes in children’s conceptualizations of artefacts functions, the research 
presented in Chapter 4 involved testing 6- to 8-year-olds. When these children were asked to choose 
one of two possible functions of tools, they also eschewed ineffective uses and choose instead the 
effective uses. Unlike the younger group in Chapter 3 however, when the ineffective uses were 
conventional or corresponded with the designer intent, 6- to 8-year-olds showed no preference 
between effective and ineffective uses. 
 
Summary of findings 
Study 1 
This study aimed to test the hypothesis that presenting information about the proper function 
of a tool can constrain assessments of inefficient tool use in children. This study tested 4- to 5-year-
olds. In two conditions, children were asked to choose one of two equally plausible functions of a 
tool while one of these was presented as the conventional or designed function and the alternative as 
a possible function. Results showed that children consistently preferred conventional to possible 
functions, however, choices between design and possible functions did not differ from chance. 
Following a study by 
Chaigneau and Puebla (2013), I introduced a malfunction manipulation, that is, in the stories 
presented to the children a character tried to use the tools for one function but failed to accomplish 
this goal. This malfunction manipulation also presented the same character accomplishing the 
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alternative possible functions. A baseline condition presenting the two functions as possible (i.e., 
not providing information about social conventions or designer’s intentions) showed that the 
malfunction manipulation had the capability to affect children’s choices of functions, as participants 
eschewed the functions involved in the malfunction episodes in favour of the alternative effective 
functions. Two additional conditions presented one critical function as conventional or designed 
while the alternative was a possible function. In these conditions the malfunction manipulation 
showed a character failing to use the tool for the critical (conventional or designed) functions while 
using it successfully for the alternative functions. Children eschewed malfunctioning design 
functions in favour of the alternative effective functions. However, children preferred 
malfunctioning conventional functions to the effective possible functions, that is, the malfunction 
manipulation did not affect conventional functions. This suggests that information about a tool’s 
proper function can affect assessments of ineffective tool use in children and that children’s 
conceptualizations of artefact functions are initially dominated by a conventionality assumption. 
 
Study 2 
This study aimed to extend the results obtained in Study 1 with a sample of 6- to 8-yearolds. 
Further, given that previous research has documented a developmental shift in children’s 
conceptualizations of artefacts around the age of 6 years or later, a second goal of this study was to 
capture possible developmental differences in children’s judgments of artefact functions. As in 
Study 1, when children were presented with a choice between a conventional and a possible 
function, they preferred the former. However in this study children also preferred design functions 
to possible functions. This age group was also sensitive to the malfunction manipulation, as 
children eschewed the functions involved in the malfunction episode in the baseline condition. 
When the malfunction manipulation was targeted against the conventional and design functions 
(and favoured the alternative possible functions) participants’ responses were at chance. This 
indicates that both social conventions and designer’s intentions affected participant’s choices. Study 
2 extended the experimental design of Study 1 by including an additional condition where 
conventionality was pitted against design and there was no malfunction episode. This sought to 
make a comprehensive comparison between these two variables. Replicating previous research 
(Defeyter et al., 2009; Siegel & Callanan, 2007), children in this condition showed no preference 
between conventional and design functions, which is consistent with both variables being important 
for their understanding of artefacts. 
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Children’s conceptual representations of artefacts 
The results presented in this thesis highlight the necessity to integrate social conventions in 
theories of artefact representations. The HIPE theory of function (Barsalou, Chaigneau & Sloman, 
2005), for example, proposes an extensive list of types of conceptual knowledge that people 
integrate in order to construe the functions of artefacts in a variety of situations. Social conventions 
about tool use do not form part of this list. Although the theory could trivially accommodate for this 
by adding a “social convention” component, the fact that this approach does not offer an account for 
the special status of proper functions renders it an unsatisfactory explanation for the results 
presented in this thesis. The intentional-historical theories (Bloom, 1996, 2000; Kelemen & Carey, 
2007) do not make any reference to the conventional dimension of artefact functions and it is 
challenging to imagine how the proposal that designer intentions are the “essence” of artefacts can 
be reconciled with the fact that social conventions showed a bigger effect than designer’s intentions 
in 4-to-5-year-olds and a equally strong effect in 6-to-8-year-olds. 
This raises the question of why social conventions dominated preschoolers’ functional 
judgments. One possibility is that, as in early stages of conceptual development, children’s 
understanding of artefact functions is strictly teleological. That is, functions correspond to the 
inferred goals of observed instrumental use of objects independently from mechanic or historical 
information (Csibra & Gergely, 2007; Hernik & Csibra, 2009). In this view, artefact functions 
would be associated with any goals a person may have for using an object (Defeyter et al., 2009), 
and the dominance of conventional functions would be explained as an extra-conceptual effect 
based on social influence. However, the fact that children seem insensitive to conventional 
functions that are not coherent with an artefacts’ physical structure (and therefore with its 
affordances, Seston Schillaci and Kelemen, 2014) renders that interpretation unlikely. Another 
possibility is that the representation of artefacts stems from the integration of two cognitive 
systems: the system dedicated to represent the physical properties of objects (intuitive physics) and 
the system dedicated to represent the properties of social agents (intuitive psychology) (German, 
Truxaw & Defeyter, 2007). In this view intuitive physics provides the primary input (in a 
hierarchical sense) to determine the function of artefacts. When the input given by this system is not 
definitive (e.g., two different functions are equally plausible as in the present studies), components 
of intuitive psychology (such as designer’s intent and social conventions) come to influence 
function judgments. Importantly, the relative weighting of these components can change through 
development (as reflected by the present results) and tasks (Defeyter et al., 2009). A complementary 
alternative is that initially children’s artefact concepts are closely tied to their understanding of the 
normative character of social conventions and only with development does the design stance 
become integrated with conventional and normative assumptions. This hypothesis predicts that 
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providing information about the original intended function of a tool should lead older children and 
adults to infer that the function is conventional and to enforce it as a social norm. Future research 
may explore these alternatives. 
 
Psychological mechanisms 
Up to this point I have assumed that the effects of functional knowledge on children’s 
evaluations of ineffective tool use are a consequence of an optimality assumption about artefact 
functions (Kelemen, Seston & St. Georges, 2012; Vaesen & Amerogen, 2008). Following this 
assumption, artefacts are created with physical features optimally efficient to perform their design 
function. Although this would seem contradictory with the present results, as well as previous 
research showing that an explicit representation of designer intentions is not present during the 
preschool years (Defeyter, Hearing & German, 2009; German & Johnson 2002; Matan & Carey, 
2001), only a basic notion of design would be needed for this explanation to be valid. According to 
this line of reasoning, children could be assuming that artefacts have optimal physical features for 
achieving a single function without explicitly representing a designer. However, even this basic 
version of the optimality assumption has problems to explain some results in the literature. For 
example, Chaigneau et al. (2008) have shown that in adults designer’s intentions can affect 
judgments of function without resorting to causal inferences about the efficacy of a tool. A 
different, and perhaps complementary, possibility is that children’s tendency to form stable goal 
attributions to objects could be interacting with the normativity assumption about artefact functions 
(Casler et al., 2009), so that once the proper function of a tool is identified it becomes a standard to 
evaluate the tool users actions (rather than be the subject of evaluations). Future studies may 
provide insight into whether the effects reported in this thesis stem from the optimality assumption, 
the normativity assumption or both. 
 
Conventionality and human tool use 
Regardless of the specific mechanism responsible for the effects of functional knowledge on 
evaluations of ineffective tool use, the results presented in this thesis are revealing of the unique 
ways conventionality drives human cognition. To be clear, this is not to say that social conventions 
do not play a role in chimpanzees’ tool use. There is field (Whiten et al., 1999) and experimental 
(Whiten, Horner & de Waal, 2005) evidence that chimpanzees can form technological traditions 
based on social influence. For example, in Whiten et al (2005) study two high-ranking chimpanzee 
females from different groups were taught, out of sight of their group members, alternative 
techniques to obtain food from the same artificial foraging mechanism (i.e., lifting versus poking), 
and later were re-introduced into their respective groups. Chimpanzees adopted the technique 
35 
 
seeded in their groups at high rates, successfully retrieving the treat. Subjects in a third group 
lacking a local expert failed the task. The differential adoption of these techniques persisted after 
two months and even chimpanzees that discovered both techniques ended up matching their group 
approach. Thus this study shows that chimpanzees reliably favour conventional uses in comparison 
to functionally equivalent alternatives (see also Hobaiter, Poisot, Zuberbühler, Hoppitt & Gruber, 
2014). In contrast, the results of Chapter 3 show that even when there is evidence contrary to the 
suitability of a tool to perform a specific function, young children will consider it to be the real 
function of the tool as far as the function is conventional. To my knowledge, there is no evidence 
that chimpanzees’ choice of tools is influenced by social conventions in this manner. 
 
Relations with functional fixedness and the systematicity of tool use 
An important issue is the relationship between the results reported in this thesis and 
functional fixedness. Although both phenomena seem to reflect an interference of the artefact 
concept with causal reasoning, there are reasons to argue that they could be serving two different 
functions in tool use. Here I’m going to resort to the distinction made in the introduction of this 
thesis between the notions of consistency and specificity. Recall that the notion of consistency 
refers to the reliable use of tools for the same goals over time, whereas specificity denotes the 
specialized use of particular tools for specific purposes. In this sense, I think that the present 
findings, and the results of Casler and Kelemen (2005, 2007) who found that children persisted in 
using a tool for a one-time demonstrated function over time, are more related to the consistency of 
tool use. Instead, I suggest that functional fixedness is more related to the specificity of tool use. By 
supporting mutually exclusive attributions of functions to objects, this effect could foster the 
emergence of specialized toolkits in a given community of tool users. In this view, the priming of 
the conventional function of a tool activates the artefact concept, which leads to the blocking of 
alternative uses for the tool. In turn, this would encourage using new means (tools) to solve new 
problems, which in the long term would results in the emergence of specialized tool sets. In this 
way functional fixedness could be seen as a by-product of a cognitive system dedicated to promote 
specific tool use in humans. Of course this post hoc theory will need further convergent evidence to 
gain plausibility. 
 
Limitations and directions for future research 
The main goal of this thesis was to test whether providing information about the proper 
function of a tool would affect children’s judgments of its functionality in cases of malfunction. A 
potential limitation of this work is the use of artificial stimuli. Although this allowed strict control 
over a number of possibly confounding variables, such as the perceived efficiency and saliency of 
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the functions used, it also limits the extent to which these results can be extrapolated to real tool-use 
situations. Therefore, future research should aim to replicate the present findings using tangible 
objects instead of drawings of artefacts. For example, in a social learning study children could be 
presented with an adult model using a real tool without success and subsequently they could be 
asked which of two alternative possible functions the object is for. Different dependent variables 
could be added too. For example, in the study described previously, not only function choice could 
be recorded but also the latency in making a choice. If conventional or design functions interfere 
with the normal assessment of the tool’s functionality a delay in the decision process would be 
expected. Further, if children were not only asked to choose a function for a tool but also to use it to 
perform the selected function, their persistence in using the tool could also be measured (e.g., how 
many trials or time before children give up in using a tool for a difficult to execute conventional 
function vs. a difficult to execute non-conventional function). Another possibility would be to ask 
children to teach a third party to how to use the tool or to explain what it is for. The main challenge 
in making these kinds of studies would be to create novel artefacts that have credible but difficult to 
execute functions.  
Future research should also aim to disentangle the role that the optimality and normativity 
assumptions play in children’s assessments of ineffective tool use. One way of doing this is using 
artefacts with pairs of functions that, while coherent with the artefact’s physical structure, differ 
slightly in their perceived efficacy (Chaigneau et al., 2008). If the effect of functional knowledge on 
assessments of ineffective tool use stems from the optimality assumption, this effect should be 
smaller for functions with lower perceived efficacy. Complementarily, an explanation based on 
normativity predicts that children should exhibit spontaneous normative behavior when faced with 
cases of atypical tool use, even if it results in malfunction. Finally, in this thesis I have compared 
the results obtained with children in Studies 1 and 2 with a study by Chaigneau and Puebla (2013) 
using adult participants. While each of these studies followed the same basic logic, the 
methodological improvements made in this thesis make a direct comparison with Chaigneau and 
Puebla prohibitive. A study with adults integrating the methodological improvements introduced 
here will no doubt shed further light on the ways in which we develop an understanding of tool 
functions. 
Finally, future research should also seek to test the effects of social conventions and 
designer’s intentions in functional fixedness. As discussed in Chapter 2, the procedure of Defeyter 
and German (2003) only specified the typical function of tools, which makes unclear which aspect 
of children’s conceptual representations of artefacts triggered this effect. The fact that in Chapter 4 
social conventions and designer’s intentions constrained 6- to 8-year-old children’s assessments of 
inefficient tool use suggest that both of these variables could trigger this effect in older children 
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(and perhaps conventional functions could also promote this effect in younger children). As 
discussed previously, based on the results of a unpublished study analyzing the relationship between 
children’s tendency to judge function in terms of the designer’s intention and their susceptibility to 
functional fixedness (Kelemen, 2001, as cited in Kelemen and Carey, 2007) Kelemen and Carey 
(2007) have suggested that functional fixedness tasks could not be measuring children’s artefact 
concepts but instead their understanding of conventionality. This hypothesis would predict that 
priming conventional functions, but not design functions, should promote functional fixedness. 
However, I think that even if only social conventions triggered this effect, discarding the influence 
of social conventions as an external influence to artefacts concepts is inconsistent with children’s 
early awareness of the normativity of artefact functions (Casler et al., 2009) and with the 
incapability of non-credible conventional functions to influence children’s function judgments 
(Seston Schillaci & Kelemen, 2014). Instead, I think that both social conventions and designer’s 
intentions are important parts of children’s conceptual representations of artefacts. In particular, I 
hypothesize that priming an artefact’s design function leads children to assume that the function is 
conventional which would trigger conceptual and normative effects. This hypothesis predicts that 
both conventional functions and design functions should promote functional fixedness, with bigger 
effects for conventional functions and possibly a modulating role of the impact of design functions. 
 
Closing words 
Our species’ propensity for generating technological traditions is a phenomenon 
unparalleled in the animal kingdom. One of the features that set our tool use apart is its level of 
systematicity: we consistently use different tools for very specific purposes. This is supported by 
the cognitive ability to attribute lasting and specific functions to objects. The present thesis aimed to 
shed light on the ways that an understanding of conventionality and intended design affects our 
attribution of functions to artefacts. It is my hope that the research reported in this thesis will be 
useful in this endeavour. 
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